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Beck and beyond: selling security in the
world risk society
ELKE KRAHMANN
Abstract. Expanding on the works of Beck and others on the growing business of risk, this
article examines the role of the private security industry in the creation, management and
perpetuation of the world risk society. It observes that the replacement of the concept of
security with risk over the past decades has permitted private firms to identify a growing
range of unknown and unknown-unknown dangers which cannot be eliminated, but require
permanent risk management. Using the discourse of risk and its strategies of commercial-
ised, individualised and reactive risk management, the private risk industry thus has
contributed to the rise of a world risk society in which the demand for security can never
be satisfied and guarantees continuous profits.
Elke Krahmann is Senior Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics
at the University of Bristol. Her main interest lies in the growing role of non-state actors
in international relations, and her current project investigates the theoretical and normative
implications of the commodification of security. She has published widely, including New
Threats and New Actors in International Security (Palgrave, 2005), Multilevel Networks in
European Foreign Policy (Ashgate, 2003) and, among others, articles in European Journal
of International Relations, International Studies Review and Global Governance. Her most
recent book States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security (Cambridge University Press,
2010) analyses the outsourcing of military services to private security firms in Europe and
North America.
Introduction
With the perceived rise of global dangers such as transnational terrorism, nuclear
proliferation, organised crime networks and global warming, Ulrich Beck’s notion
of the world risk society has received increasing attention in International
Relations.1 Numerous studies have analysed how the changing nature of contem-
porary risks, the growing concern with the future and the shift from the
elimination to the management of risks are changing the ways in which
governments deal with security issues.2 One area which has so far been under-
1 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992); Ulrich Beck, World Risk
Society (Cambridge: Polity, 1999).
2 See, for example, Louise Amoore and Marieke de Goede (eds), Risk and the War on Terror (London:
Routledge, 2008); Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster, ‘Governing Terrorism Through Risk:
Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future’, European Journal of International Relations, 13:1
(2007), pp. 89–115; Christopher Daase and Oliver Kessler, ‘Knowns and Unknowns in the “War on
Terror”: Uncertainty and the Political Construction of Danger’, Security Dialogue, 38:4 (2007),
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examined is the role of private businesses in the emergence, management and
perpetuation of the world risk society. Beck acknowledges that the risk society has
reached a new level with the self-referential exploitation of industrial risks. He
argues: ‘Modernization risks from the winner’s point of view are big business. They
are the insatiable demands long sought by economists.’3 Yet, focussed primarily on
the known risks resulting from modern industrial production, such as nuclear
radiation and environmental pollution, Beck neglects the big business of unknown
and unknown-unknown risks and risk management in today’s hyper-sensitised
societies.
This article seeks to address this gap through an analysis of the growing market
for private risk management services. It argues that the world risk society is not
only the outcome of unintended modernisation dangers, but also a creation of
private companies which have commodified risks in Europe and North America
since the 1970s. Initially, these businesses focussed on the provision of security as
related to physical dangers such as robbery and burglary. In recent years, however,
the search for new sales opportunities has encouraged firms across a widening
range of economic sectors, from healthcare and food to consumer goods, to
indentify a wide variety of risks to the safety and wellbeing of peoples. This
expansion of the private market in risks contributes to the perpetuation of the
world risk society through its discourse of unknown and unknown-unknown risks.
Moreover, it suggests that the economy of the world risk society has become
reflexive in a second sense. The first reflexivity concerns the management of the
unintended side effects of economic industrialisation. The second, new reflexivity
regards the imaginary creation and management of unknown and unknown-
unknown risks by a specialised risk industry. Finally, contrary to Beck who
believes that the global nature of dangers such as ecological problems, global
financial crises and transnational terrorist networks will lead to increasing popular
demand for cosmopolitan political solutions, this article suggests that the risk
discourses and practices of private businesses offer an alternative vision of the
future in which industrialised societies manage their risk through individual
consumer choices.4 The private risk industry, thus, holds the potential for
undermining the political elimination of risks and the end to the reflexive
generation of the world risk society.
To support this argument, this article investigates the operation of the risk
industry in an area which has figured prominently in the analysis of the world risk
society: the terrorism-crime nexus. In this area, the perception of interconnected
transnational dangers linking disparate issues such as state failure, terrorism, crime
and immigration has replaced the seemingly clear distinctions between internal and
external security, and military and non-military threats. Moreover, increasing
concern about these issues has facilitated the rise of a huge private security sector
in Europe and North America. In the UK alone, security firms had a turnover of
over £4 billion in 2006 and some have estimated that the global market for
pp. 411–34; Yee-Kuang Heng, ‘Unravelling the “War” on Terrorism: A Risk-Management Exercise
in War Clothing’, Security Dialogue, 33:2 (2002), pp. 227–42; Keith Spence, ‘World Risk Society and
War against Terror’, Political Studies, 53:6 (2005), pp. 284–302.
3 Beck, Risk Society, p. 23.
4 Ulrich Beck, ‘The Silence of Words: On Terror and War’, Security Dialogue, 34:3 (2003), pp. 255–67,
p. 257.
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commercial security services would reach $200 billion by 2010.5 Notably, private
clients buy 70–90 per cent of these services. Focusing on security guarding firms in
the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), the following sections
explore how this industry contributes to the emergence, management and continu-
ation of the world risk society through its own autonomous logic and risk
management strategies.
Risk society and the market
Building on Beck’s Risk Society and World Risk Society as well as Michel
Foucault’s governmentality framework, the roles and strategies of governments in
generating, sustaining and managing risk perceptions and the risk society have
received much attention in the analysis of risk in International Relations. On the
one hand, such studies have included the investigation of the risk management
mechanisms of governmental agencies and international organisations in the ‘war
on terror’ and other political issues.6 Mike Raco, for example, argues that ‘the
concept of risk-environments based on the selective generation of fear has been a
central part of government strategies to develop, promote and implement new
agendas of economic development.’7 On the other hand, research on risk has
examined the governmental use of risk discourses and practices to ‘discipline’
populations.8 In this sense, Deborah Lupton contends that ‘risk may be under-
stood as a governmental strategy of regulatory power by which populations and
individuals are monitored and managed through the goals of neo-liberalism.’9
The contribution of businesses to the emergence of risk discourses and the
management of risk has so far been under-researched.10 Although many authors
acknowledge the participation of private firms in the management of risks, the
specific mechanisms of the risk industry have not yet been investigated in detail
beyond the contexts of insurance and, recently, aviation security.11 This gap is
5 Data from the British Security Industry Association, available at: {http://www.bsia.co.uk}.
6 Christopher Coker, Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the
Management of Risk, Adelphi Paper 345 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for The International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002); Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War. Terror,
Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
7 Mike Raco, ‘Risk, Fear and Control: Deconstructing the Discourses of New Labour’s Economic
Policy’, Space & Polity, 6:1 (2002), pp. 25–47, p. 26.
8 Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate, ‘Criminology and Terrorism: Which Thesis? Risk Society or
Governmentality?’, British Journal of Criminology, 46:3 (2006), pp. 379–98; Aradau and van
Munster, ‘Governing Terrorism Through Risk’.
9 Deborah Lupton, Risk (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 29.
10 Notable exceptions include Maria Łos´, ‘Post-communist Fear of Crime and the Commercialization
of Security’, Theoretical Criminology, 6:2 (2002), pp. 165–88; and Louise Amoore and Marieke De
Goede, ‘Governance, Risk and Dataveillance in the War on Terror’, Crime, Law & Social Change,
43:2–3 (2005), pp. 149–73.
11 François Ewald, ‘Insurance and Risk’, in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds),
The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991),
pp. 197–210; Mark B. Salter, ‘Imagining Numbers: Risk, Quantification and Aviation Security’,
Security Dialogue, Special Issue on Security, Technologies of Risk, and the Political, 39:2–3 (2008),
pp. 243–66. It is unclear, however, whether Salter sees the rationalities and technologies of private
aviation security services as part of a larger ‘dispositif’ that subsumes state as well as commercial
actors.
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particularly surprising since both Beck and Foucault suggest that the modern
market economy not only plays a crucial role in the emergence of the risk society,
but also operates according to its distinct objectives and autonomous logic.12
Beck himself fails to analyse the growing market in risk management in greater
detail, despite his argument that the world risk society has its origins in the
industrial development from classical to reflexive modernity. In fact, he devotes
only two pages in his book Risk Society to the question of how private firms are
profiting from the identification, assessment and mitigation of risk.13 In his
narrative, contemporary risks are real and they have changed:
The risks and hazards of today thus differ in an essential way from the superficially similar
ones of the Middle Ages through the global nature of their threat (people, animals and
plants) and through their modern causes. They are risks of modernization. They are a
wholesale produce of industrialization, and are systematically intensified as it becomes
global.’14
Businesses have contributed to the creation of these dangers through uncon-
strained, reckless and globally expanding industrialisation.15 In addition to being
the result of globalising industrial production, these new dangers are also more
dangerous and less predictable than the dangers of the past. According to Beck, the
potentially devastating nature of these dangers, their global reach and their
incalculability require a new term: risks. Reflexive modernisation, the defining
feature of the risk society, is the result of the changing nature of these
modernisation hazards. Modernisation becomes reflexive in the sense that it has to
deal with the risks that industrial modernisation has produced.16
Beck views industrialisation risks primarily as unintended side effects, but his
analysis contains the seeds for a broader understanding of the role of businesses in
the risk society. In particular, he notes that industrial capitalism is becoming
reflexive because ‘risks are no longer the dark side of opportunities, they are also
market opportunities.’17 Firms can make a profit from managing the risks that they
or others have created. Moreover, businesses cannot only manufacture risks in a
material sense, but also discursively. Thus, Beck writes: ‘Demands, and thus
markets, of a completely new type can be created by varying the definition of risk,
especially demand for the avoidance of risk – open to interpretation, causally
designable and infinitely reproducible.’18 Finally, Beck notes that risk management
can take two forms: the first seeks to eliminate the causes of risk in industrial
modernisation; the second turns the management of the consequences of risk into
a new industry sector.19
For the following analysis, these contentions suggest three core hypotheses.
Firstly, the private risk industry operates according to its own distinct logic which
12 Colin Gordon, ‘Governmental Rationality: An Introduction’, in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon
and Peter Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 1–51, p. 11, p. 16.
13 Beck, Risk Society, pp. 56–7. A general account of the role of private capital in globalisation can
be found in Ulrich Beck, Power in the Global Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005).
14 Ibid., p. 21.
15 Ibid., p. 24.
16 Ibid., p. 21.
17 Ibid., p. 46.
18 Ibid., p. 56.
19 Ibid., p. 175.
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is concerned with the expansion of consumer demand and profit. Secondly, the
concept of risk is particularly suited to this aim because it permits the identification
of unknown and unknown-unknown risks through interpretation and imagination.
Thirdly, the risk industry can perpetuate the demand for its services by dealing
with the consequences rather than the causes of global risks.
Despite these observations, Beck believes that the destructiveness, the global
scope and the incalculability of the new risks hold the potential for mobilising
public demand for cosmopolitan political solutions rather than a growth of the
private risk industry. While he accepts that the world risk society may become
differentiated between those who profit from the production and management of
risks and those who suffer the consequences, this appears to be merely an
intermediary stage.20 Beck seems confident that, eventually, societies across the
globe will accept that ‘objectively’ the new risks ‘display an equalizing effect within
their scope and among those affected by them.’21
There are several problems with and limitations to Beck’s argument.22 The first
problem is Beck’s usage of the term risk to denote a distinct set of man-made
global modernisation dangers. This definition prevents Beck from investigating the
particular utility and increasing use of the concept of risk in public, academic and
economic discourses. The second regards Beck’s argument concerning the origins
and future of the world risk society which appears to be shaped largely by recent
German history and disregards other societies where a greater emphasis seems to
be put on non-political mass responses to the new risks, such as voluntarism,
private market solutions and changes in consumer behaviour. Finally, Beck fails to
examine in greater detail the mechanisms which contribute to the management and
perpetuation of the world risk society. Concentrating on a meta-narrative of
historical transformation and change, his research does not answer the question of
how the world risk society is sustained. As a result, Beck cannot explain why so
far little progress has been made towards the transformation of the world risk
society through global cosmopolitan movements.23
This article seeks to address these limitations and expand on Beck’s limited
analysis of the role of businesses in the creation, management and continuation of
the world risk society. To do so, it examines in detail the underlying logic,
discursive strategies and risk management mechanisms of the private security
industry with regard to terrorism and crime.24 It is beyond the scope of this article
to examine in how far these mechanisms are distinct from or similar to those of
other economic sectors such as insurance, healthcare or the environmental industry
which have been analysed elsewhere.25 However, it hopefully contributes to
20 Ibid., p. 46.
21 Ibid., p. 36.
22 Scott Campbell and Greg Currie, ‘Against Beck: In Defence of Risk Analysis’, Philosophy of the
Social Sciences, 36:2 (2006), pp. 149–72; Robert Dingwall, ‘“Risk Society”: The Cult Theory and the
Millennium?’, Social Policy and Administration, 33:4 (1999), pp. 474–91.
23 Claudia Aradau, Luis Lobo-Guerro and Rens van Munster, ‘Security, Technologies of Risk, and the
Political: Guest Editors’ Introduction’, Security Dialogue, Special Issue on Security, Technologies of
Risk, and the Political, 39:2–3 (2008), pp. 147–54, pp. 148–9, p. 151.
24 This analysis bears an intentional resemblance to the investigation of the underlying ‘rationalities’
and ‘technologies’ of risk management employed by Foucauldian scholars, but employs different
terms in order to emphasise that it remains within Beck’s framework of analysis.
25 Nancy Press, Jennifer R. Fishman and Barbara A Koenig, ‘Collective Fear, Individualized Risk: The
Social and Cultural Context for the Genetic Testing for Breast Cancer’, Nursing Ethics, 7:3 (2000),
Beck and beyond 353
expanding our understanding of the growing business of risk and presents another
step towards a general typology of commercial risk management.
The concept of risk
Especially in his later work, Beck accepts that risks are not merely defined by the
physical environment, but also by social construction. Responding to his critics,
Beck writes: ‘it is cultural perception and definition that constitute risk.’26
However, Beck is sceptical of a purely constructivist framework because it does not
allow him to distinguish between real and perceived dangers. His analyses of risk
and the world risk society rely ultimately on the contention that material dangers
have objectively taken on a new form. This section seeks to illustrate that Beck’s
focus on the material transformations of global dangers has led him to neglect the
question of how the discourse and practices of risk are changing the public
perception of these and other dangers. Moreover, the following illustrates that the
concept of risk and its particular logic shape how contemporary dangers are
addressed.
The investigation of risk as a discursive concept also suggests a modification to
the understanding of the risk society. If it is not (only) the nature of the danger
which has changed, but (also) their analysis through the concept of risk, the
relationship between the emergence of global modernisation risks and the risk
society changes. Instead of being (exclusively) the result of the material transfor-
mation of ‘real’ dangers, the defining feature of the risk society becomes its
obsession with risk. In this interpretation, the risk society is characterised by a
growing concern with future risks and the proliferation of institutional and private
practices of risk management.27
Known, unknown and unknown-unknown risks
Risk has been described as ‘a multidimensional concept whose definition and
articulation are critically dependent upon the objectives and rationales of those
using it to promote their own agendas.’28 This raises the question of who benefits
from the emergence of risk as a central concept in the discourse on security. In
order to understand the particular characteristics and utility of the concept of risk,
it is first necessary to note its definition. Against Beck, predominant political,
economic and academic parlance defines risk not as a distinct type of modernisa-
tion danger, but as a measure of the level of insecurity calculated by the probability
pp. 237–49; Ewald, ‘Insurance and Risk’; Salter, ‘Imagining Numbers: Risk, Quantification and
Aviation Security’.
26 Beck, World Risk Society, p. 135.
27 Richard V. Ericson and Aaron Doyle, ‘Catastrophe Risk, Insurance and Terrorism’, Economy and
Society, 33:2 (2004), pp. 135–73, p. 141; Anthony Giddens, ‘Risk Society: The Context of British
Politics’, in Jane Franklin (ed.), The Politics of the Risk Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998),
pp. 23–34, p. 26.
28 Raco, ‘Risk, Fear and Control’, p. 27.
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of a hazard multiplied by its impact.29 Since past experience provides the best basis
for the inference of both the potential impact and the probability of a danger, the
less frequent a danger, the more difficult it becomes to assess the associated risk.
For the purposes of this article, it is useful to distinguish between three levels of
risk on a continuum of frequency, calculability and familiarity with certain
dangers: known, unknown, and unknown-unknown risks.30
Known risks denote dangers affecting peoples’ lives on a permanent or regular
basis. They are ‘known’ if a significant number of people has personally observed
or experienced these dangers or if there is a large amount of public and verifiable
information about them. Before the rise of the concept of risk in the jargon of
security experts and the general public, known risks used to be referred to as
‘threats’. Threats denote dangers which have been clearly identified.31 Threats exist
in the present rather than the future.32 A known set of triggers will lead to
instantaneous harm. During the Cold War, for example, the nuclear weapons of
each superpower were conceived of as a threat. Each side had verifiable
information about the number, direction and lethality of the other’s nuclear
weapons and declared policies of mutual destruction or first use confirmed their
deployment under specified circumstances. In sum, the notion of ‘known’ risk or
threat emphasises simultaneously the certainty of a danger and its imminence.
In the second category are ‘unknown’ risks. These risks are related to dangers
which can be calculated in terms of their probability and impact on the basis of
past records. However, it is unknown where exactly and with what consequences
they will occur next. Unknown risks are within the individual experience of some
people, but not of entire populations, and are exemplified by dangers such as
terrorism, robbery or traffic accidents. Unknown risks refer to the principal
definition of risks as calculable, but unknown future dangers. While threats will
lead to harm under certain conditions, unknown risks can lead to harm at any
time.
The third category is ‘unknown-unknown’ risks. They concern dangers with a
very low probability or where the probability is unknown because there are no
previous experiences of such hazards. Unknown-unknown risks are incalculable
future dangers. Unknown-unknown risks are also outside the individual or
collective experience of anybody. Instead, unknown-unknown risks are identified
through speculation. Rather than being based on the statistical analysis of past
incidents, they are efforts to explore the future through imagination.33 Despite a
low probability, unknown-unknown risks can be high on public and political
agendas because of their equally speculative, devastating consequences. These
imagined consequences gain credibility through ‘worst-case narratives and disaster
rehearsals.’34 Examples of unknown-unknown risks include the danger of new
29 John Adams, Risk (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 69.
30 This definition departs somewhat from Daase and Kessler, ‘Knowns and Unknowns in the ‘War on
Terror’, but is not incompatible with it.
31 Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War, p. 1.
32 Janne Flyghed, ‘Crime-Control in the Post-Wall Era: The Menace of Security’, Journal of
Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention, 6:2 (2005), pp. 165–82; Aradau et al.,
‘Security, Technologies of Risk, and the Political: Guest Editors’ Introduction’, pp. 148–9; Mythen
and Walklate, ‘Criminology and Terrorism’, p. 381.
33 Frank Furedi, Culture of Fear Revisited (London: Continuum, 2006), p. xi.
34 Marieke De Goede, ‘Beyond Risk: Premediation and the Post-9/11 Security Imagination’, Security
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chemical or biological weapons or the development of new strategies of destruction
by transnational terrorists.
Due to these characteristics, the transition from the concept of security to risk
in contemporary discourses and practices has several important consequences.
Firstly, the emergence of risk as a central concept has made possible the shift from
the known threats of the Cold War era to today’s concern with unknown and
unknown-unknown risks with serious implications for the provision of security.
While the realist concept of security implies that dangers can be eliminated, the
probabilistic concept of risk suggests that insecurity can only be managed. A
notion of security building on risk means that security can never be attained. Zero
risk does not exist. Therefore, the concept of risk guarantees constant demand.
Risks require permanent surveillance, analysis, assessment and mitigation.
Secondly, the concept of risk makes possible the discourse of unknown-
unknown risk. It allows demand for security management to expand from
personally known threats and calculable unknown risks to risks that exist only in
the imagination. The potential range of imaginable risks is infinite. Whereas threats
can be personally observed and experienced, and unknown risks can be statistically
assessed, unknown-unknown risks are beyond knowledge and evaluation. The
concept of risk, thus, allows and even legitimises the inflation of risk perception
beyond the apparent to the inconceivable in the name of precaution.
Thirdly, since unknown and unknown-unknown risks are outside personal
experience, the concept of risk leads to a growing dependence on experts for the
identification, analysis and assessment of risks. The world risk society needs experts
to tell it what it should fear. Moreover, there is no way of challenging the risk
assessments of experts who inform the public of unknown and unknown-unknown
risks. Due to the futurity of unknown risks and the incalculability of unknown-
unknown risks, it is impossible to prove experts wrong. In a reversal of Beck it can
be argued that expert prognoses of risk and insecurity cannot be refuted even by
the absence of actual accidents because the risk discourse is based on a set of
speculative assumptions and moves exclusively within a framework of probability
statements.35
Finally, the latter makes it difficult to evaluate of the utility of professional risk
management. Since risks happen in the future, their non-occurrence can be due
equally to faulty risk assessment or successful risk mitigation. Effective risk
management is, by definition, a non-event.36 The concept of risk, therefore, permits
the inflation of demand by focussing on the input of risk management and not on
its results. In the logic of risk, the more unknown and unknown-unknown risks are
identified, analysed and mitigated against, the less likely they are to happen.
Returning to the question who benefits from the discourse of risk, a multitude
of studies have illustrated that governments have used the notion of risk to control
and gain the support of their populations.37 However, it has been little noted that
Dialogue, Special Issue on Security, Technologies of Risk, and the Political, 39:2–3 (2008),
pp. 155–76, p. 156.
35 Beck, Risk Society, p. 29.
36 Heng, ‘Unravelling the “War” on Terrorism,’ p. 236.
37 Mythen and Walklate, ‘Criminology and Terrorism’, p. 385; Jane Franklin, ‘Politics and Risk’, in
Sandra Waltlake and Gabe Mythen (eds), Beyond the Risk Society (Buckingham: Open University
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for democratic governments the concept and discourse of risk can be a double-
edged sword. While it can increase executive control over policies and populations,
the discourse of risk and fear can also undermine electoral trust in governments if
the risks prove unfounded or if governments fail to appear to restore order and
security. Governments who use the concept of risk to justify their policies walk a
fine line. Although they can exploit public fear for political purposes, these
governments have to convince their populations that the risks are ‘real’ and
addressed effectively if they want to be re-elected. Moreover, governments have
limited resources. Increased risk perception leads to demands for improved public
security measures such as additional police patrols, but tax increases to fund such
measures are often unpopular.
The intervention in Iraq illustrates this dilemma. Tony Blair’s popularity
suffered permanently from public scepticism regarding the level of risk posed by
Iraq and the subsequent failure of the allied forces to find evidence of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD).38 In the US, George W. Bush’s assertion of the risk of
global terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan helped him to remain in power after the
2004 presidential elections. However, Bush’s subsequent inability to establish peace
in Iraq and the rising cost of the occupation contributed to undermining popular
support for his party resulting in the election of a Democrat majority in both
Houses of Congress in 2006 and Barack Obama for president in 2009.
The private risk industry has no such problems. For businesses, the fact that
risks can never fully be eliminated promises insatiable demand. In fact, private
security firms exacerbate risk perception in order to sell their services.39 The fact
that risks cannot be eradicated is not a problem because public expectations
regarding the capabilities of businesses and states differ markedly. While the public
hires firms to micromanage their personal risks, it expects their governments to
address and eliminate risks at a macro-level. The ‘consumer’ accepts that private
business solutions to risks are only temporary and individual, while the ‘citizen’
demands that the government develops permanent and collective responses to the
new risks. Consumers would also never expect that private firms provide for their
security unless they pay them. Conversely, many citizens seem to believe that tax
cuts and increased national and international security measures are compatible.
While citizens are likely to vote a government which fails to address perceived risks
out of office, consumers who have become targets of terrorist attacks or burglaries
are advised to upgrade their private security by buying more advanced technologies
and more extensive services.40 Most importantly, businesses sell security, while
governments have to pay for it. Firms do not have to balance manufactured
increases in risk perception against existing or potentially available budgets. On the
contrary, rising private risk perception increases business profits.
Press, 2006), p. 160; David L. Altheide, ‘Consuming Terrorism’, Symbolic Interaction, 27:3 (2004),
pp. 289–308, p. 292.
38 Alan Travis and Ian Black, ‘Blair’s Popularity Plummets’, The Guardian (18 February 2003); Kevin
Sullivan, ‘Brown Acts to Distance Himself from Blair, Iraq’, Washington Post (25 September 2007);
NN, ‘It Has Led to a Massive Loss of Trust’, The Guardian (30 April 2005).
39 Łos´, ‘Post-communist Fear of Crime and the Commercialization of Security’, p. 178.
40 See, for example, Westguard Security Ltd., at: {http://www.westguardsecurity.co.uk} and Hart Security
Ltd., at: {http://www.hartsecurity.com}.
Beck and beyond 357
Risk perception and the culture of fear
The industry’s ability to profit from risk management provides it with a vested
interest in the creation, expansion and continuation of the demand for its services.
Fear is one of its strongest marketing tools.41 The emergence of a ‘culture of fear’
in risk societies directly benefits the private risk industry. This culture of fear is
created through the continuous discursive rehearsal of alleged dangers in all aspects
of life.42 In the UK and the US, the terms ‘risk’ and ‘at risk’ are thus ‘used in
association with just about any routine event.’43 Due to the lack of personal
experience of unknown and unknown-unknown risk, mass mediated and expert
interpretations of potential dangers play a critical role in the manufacture of
private risk perception. Unfortunately, the old adage ‘bad news is good news’
applies to the mass media as well as the risk industry. The practices of the
media and the risk industry, thus, support each other in creating a spiral of
perceived risk escalation. Industry experts lend credibility to bad news in the
media, and bad news in the media generates rising private demand for commercial
risk management.
The impact of media and industry advertisements on fear is well researched.44
Although individual risk perception varies considerably depending on age, gender,
class, living area or culture, extensive press coverage of specific dangers or risks
increases fear independently of other factors. A study of crime reporting and fear
of violence in Finland observed that already the indirect exposure to crime news
in the form of ever present tabloid front pages and billboard advertisements in
urban landscapes contributes to growing fear among citizens.45 Personal risk
perception increases in direct proportion to the exposure to media reporting of
crime, and the reading of front page news in tabloid papers is directly related to
attempts to avoid risks. In fact, empirical research has demonstrated that all forms
of threat reporting, including about traffic accidents or environmental degradation,
contribute to people’s perception of ‘life as “scary”, dangerous and fearful.’46
It is little surprising that in most industrialised nations the media and marketing
discourse on risks, public anxiety and private security industry turnover have
increased simultaneously since the 1970s. The statistic risks of terrorist and
criminal attacks have decreased for much of the past three decades, but Western
societies are more fearful than ever. In the US, key newspapers’ association of fear
with violence and crime increased six-fold between 1984 and 1999, that is, before
9/11.47 The discourse of fear ‘resonates through public information and is
becoming a part of what a mass society holds in common: We increasingly share
41 Anne-Marie Vincent and Alan J. Dubinsky, ‘Impact of Fear Appeals in a Cross-Cultural Context’,
Journal of Euromarketing, 14:1/2 (2004), pp. 145–67.
42 David L. Altheide and R. Sam Michalowski, ‘Fear in the News: A Discourse of Control’, The
Sociological Quarterly, 40:3 (1999), pp. 475–503; Altheide and Michalowski, ‘Fear in the News’,
p. 476.
43 Furedi, Culture of Fear Revisisted, p. xvii.
44 Altheide and Michalowski, ‘Fear in the News’, pp. 475–503.
45 Mirka Smolej and Janne Kivivuori, ‘The Relation between Crime News and Fear of Violence’,
Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology, 7:2 (2006), pp. 211–27, p. 215.
46 Altheide and Michalowski, ‘Fear in the News’, p. 479; Smolej and Kivivuori, ‘The Relation between
Crime News and Fear of Violence’, p. 221.
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understandings about what to fear and how to avoid it.’48 Similarly, Furedi finds
that the use of the term ‘at risk’ in UK newspapers increased nine-fold between
1994 and 2000.49
Risks appear all pervasive. A content analysis of the websites of British security
guarding firms, which have seen the highest increases in turnover over the past
decades (see Figure 1), reveals a range of discursive strategies supporting this
impression.50 Foremost are statements highlighting the multiplicity of unknown
and unknown-unknown risks everybody faces today. As one company puts it
ominously, ‘Your business operation faces a growing number of risks from an array
of sources.’51 Terrorism, crime and other unnamed dangers merge into a seamless
web of a complex and interconnected security risks. Thus, another private security
firm suggests, ‘the risk of terrorism and organised crime sits alongside the exposure
to internal breaches of security’,52 while a third observes ‘the ever-present risks of
fire, flood, theft, vandalism, terrorism and occasionally, industrial espionage.’53 A
second marketing strategy highlights the actuality and changing nature of these
security risks. References to ‘recent world events’, ‘the current climate’ and ‘the
modern world’ suggest that contemporary dangers are new, pressing and requiring
immediate action.54 Finally, against statistical evidence, many private security firms
assert the ‘increasing number of crime related incidents’55 and a growing terrorist
threat ‘which may involve introducing measures that have never been considered
before.’56
48 Ibid., p. 476.
49 Furedi, Culture of Fear Revisited, p. xvii.
50 The firms are listed as members of the British Security Industry Association, at: {http://www.bsia.
co.uk}.
51 Pilgrims Group Ltd., at: {http://www.pilgrimsgroup.com}. Emphasis added.
52 Hart Security Ltd., at: {http://www.hartsecurity.com}.
53 Elite Security Group Ltd., at: {http://www.elitesecuritygroup.co.uk}. Emphasis added.
54 Ian Johnson Associates Ltd., at: {http://www.ija.co.uk}; Advance Security Ltd., at: {http://www.
advancesecurity.co.uk}.
55 Crown Security Services, at: {http://www.crownsecurity.uk.com}.
56 Ian Johnson Associates Ltd., at: {http://www.ija.co.uk}.
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The combination of media and industry claims regarding the heightened risk of
terrorism and crime has amplified public fear and demand for private security
services. An Ipsos MORI poll conducted in 1999 found that 25 per cent of Britons
worried permanently about a potential burglary, and 15 per cent had acquired
professional home security advice.57 A survey in 2006 showed that Britons were
more concerned about crime and violence than citizens in the US and other major
European countries. In the UK, 43 per cent mentioned crime and violence as the
most pressing concern of their country, compared to 40 per cent in France and
Italy, 31 per cent in Spain, 27 per cent in the US, and 21 per cent in Germany.
Britons were also the least confident in their government’s ability to deal with these
problems with 29 per cent, compared to 57 per cent in Germany, 48 per cent in
Italy, 44 per cent in France and the US, and 35 per cent in Spain.58
The same time period that has seen the rise in public fear and risk perception
has witnessed a massive expansion of the private security industry. Between 1991
and 2005, the turnover of private security companies in the UK rose by no less
than 330 per cent, that is, an average of 23 per cent annually. In the US, the
average growth of the private security industry lay by 8–10 per cent per year.59 By
comparison, the UK manufacturing sector only expanded on average by 0.5 per
cent and even the IT sector grew only by 6–8 per cent annually during the same
period.
While Beck believes that the inherent incalculability of global modernisation
risks allows people to challenge the risk assessments of experts, he also sees the
danger that an inability to agree on the ‘real’ risks ‘throws the door open to a
feudalization of scientific knowledge through economic and political interests and
“new dogmas”.’60 People might be able to resist the discourse of fear by pointing
out the unverified and complex assumptions of expert calculations regarding
unknown and unknown-unknown risks; but to do so is in itself a risk which people
might not want to take. A precautionary response becomes even more likely if, as
the media and business advertisements do, risks are not related to peoples
themselves, but to those for whom they care or are responsible.61 People might be
willing to take risks for themselves, but they are disinclined to accept risks for
those they love or are accountable for. References to one’s children, family or
employees permeate the discourse on risk. The next section investigates how the
specific logics and mechanisms of private security management build on the
concept of risk and the culture of fear to further expand the demand for its
services.
57 Ipsos MORI, ‘One in Four Britons Lives in Fear of Burglary’ (23 August 1999).
58 Ipsos MORI, ‘Britons Most Worried about Crime – and Government Is Least Trusted to Deal with
It’ (6 November 2006).
59 British Security Industry Association, at: {http://www.bsia.co.uk}; NN, ‘Ride the Wave’, Security
Executive (April/May 2007), pp. 11–15, p. 11.
60 Beck, Risk Society, p. 156–7. Beck makes this argument with regard to the tendency of governments
and experts to ‘downplay’ modernisation risks such as nuclear power and genetic modification, but
of course it can also be viewed in the reverse.
61 Altheide and Michalowski, ‘Fear in the News’, pp. 491–2.
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Commercial risk management
Private businesses not only contribute to the emergence of the world risk society
through discursive strategies, they also offer to manage the risks that they identify.
However, as the concept of risk employed by the private security industry
magnifies and sustains demand, so does commercial risk management. The demand
inflating logic and mechanisms of private risk management can be observed in
three areas: risk identification, risk assessment and risk mitigation.62 Risk
identification concerns the detection of potential dangers and their targets. Risk
assessment calculates the relative probability and impact of different types of
dangers and seeks to establish priorities for risk mitigation. Finally, risk mitigation
aims to prevent or limit the damage of a hazard. The following sections examine
each in turn.
Risk identification
Beck believes in the collectivising capacity of global risks such as transnational
terrorism and environmental degradation. According to him, fear will create
solidarity and lead to the formation of new cosmopolitan political communities to
collectively address common dangers.63 Yet, in the UK and the US, a frequent
response to the rise in risk perception and the emergence of cultures of fear appears
to have been the alienation of individuals from their social environments. Rather
than finding a new sense of solidarity, many people seem to shut themselves off,
both physically and psychologically, from suspect or simply unknown ‘others’
within gated communities, purportedly safe housing districts, private schools and
locked cars.64 Beyond the general individualisation of modern society, one of the
origins of this behaviour appears to be the differences in personal risks and
individual responsibility emphasised in private industry discourses and practices.65
Notably, the private industry portrays risks as personal characteristics and
pro-active risk management as the responsibility of everybody.66
The individualising logic of commercial risk identification plays a crucial part
in increasing private consumption of security services by attributing risks to
persons rather than collectives. Although probabilistic risk statistics concern
collectives ‘this information is conveyed as exact, certain and tailored to the
individual.’67 The media and industry abound with statistics, tests and services
offering personal risk profiles depending on age, sex, occupation and other factors.
These risk profiles generate the impression that everybody’s risks are distinct and
that, therefore, they require individualised solutions. Private security and other risk
62 Beat Habegger, ‘Risk Analysis and Management in a Dynamic Risk Landscape’ in ibid. (ed.),
International Handbook on Risk Analysis and Management (Zurich: Center for Security Studies,
2008), pp. 13–32, pp. 21–7.
63 Beck, Risk Society, p. 74.
64 Lupton, Risk, p. 47.
65 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1991).
66 Furedi, Culture of Fear Revisited, p. 5.
67 Press et al., ‘Collective Fear, Individualized Risk’, p. 242.
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management firms present even inherently collective dangers as personal and
selective. Their risk identification strategies transform Beck’s ‘de-bounded’ mod-
ernisation risks, such as nuclear waste, genetic modification and terrorism, into
bounded personal risks, depending on whether a person lives near a nuclear waste
disposal site, eats genetically modified food or flies with American airlines.68
The advertisements of private security firms in the UK illustrate the individu-
alising logic of commercial risk identification. As one company proclaims, ‘no two
businesses security needs are identical.’69 Implying that governments and the public
police cannot take these differences into account, private security companies
promise to analyse each individual clients’ particular risks and provide ‘bespoke’
services, which can be ‘tailored to clients’ requirements and can be delivered
whenever and wherever they are needed.’70 In fact, the assertion that the security
risks of every customer are distinct is one of the most widely-found statements on
security firms’ websites in the UK.71 The American Security Industry Association
agrees that the ability of private security firms to cater to the divergent needs of
individual consumers is one of the key reasons for the expansion of the private
security sector.72
Conjoined with the individualisation of risk is the logic of individual responsi-
bility for containing them. Where risks are ascribed to persons rather than societies
and states, the individual is seen not only as able to, but also as responsible for
managing their risks.73 The rise of neo-liberalism since the 1980s has facilitated this
responsibilisation of citizens at the same time as it has favoured private market
over public service solutions to social needs and risks such as healthcare, transport
and energy. Individualised responsibility detracts attention from collective and
political responses to risks and focuses on how people can improve their personal
risk profiles through consumer choices. As Raco notes, ‘insecurity becomes
associated with individual deficiencies, rather than broader structures.’74 Health
risks such as cancer become the responsibility of individuals who are encouraged
to lower their body weight, eat food rich in anti-oxidants, take vitamin supple-
ments and exercise instead of the concern of governments which could be
encouraged to investigate and regulate the radiation emitted by mobile phone
masts, pesticides in drinking water and hormone additives in meat.75
Also with regard to terrorism and crime, government discourses suggest the
responsibility of potential victims to protect themselves and, thus, promote
commercial security solutions.76 The British police, for example, seek to contain the
68 Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat’, p. 41.
69 BritSec International Ltd., at: {http://www.britsec.co.uk}.
70 ArmorGroup International Plc., at: {http://www.armorgroup.com}.
71 See, for example, Ian Johnson Associates Ltd., at: {http://www.ija.co.uk}; Allander Security Ltd., at:
{http://www.allandersecurity.com}; Britsafe, at: {http://www.britsafe.com}; Crown Security Services,
at: {http://www.crownsecurity.uk.com}; Danhouse Security Ltd., at: {http://www.danhouse.co.uk};
Duval Security Ltd., at: {http://www.duvalsecurity.co.uk}; Elite Security Group Ltd., at: {http://www.
elitesecuritygroup.co.uk}.
72 SIA, Security Industry Overview, available at: {http://www.siaonline.org/response.asp?c=industry_
overview&r=1024}.
73 Press et al., ‘Collective Fear, Individualized Risk,’, p. 241.
74 Raco, ‘Risk, Fear and Control’, p. 29.
75 Press et al., ‘Collective Fear, Individualized Risk’, p. 245.
76 Pat O’Malley, ‘Criminology and Risk’, in Sandra Waltlake and Gabe Mythen (eds), Beyond the Risk
Society (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2006), pp. 43–59, p. 49.
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risk of crime by advising people to lock their doors, sling handbags across their
bodies and not to walk home alone at night.77 Even the globalising danger of
transnational terrorism becomes a personal responsibility. Thus, UK government
recommendations regarding a WMD attack by terrorists have been ‘skewed
towards the individual – “what can you do to protect yourself and your community
against risk”’.78 In the same manner, Metropolitan police told local businesses after
the London attacks to take action to step up the safeguards for their premises.79
Some years earlier, the US government’s recommendation that citizens could
protect themselves against a biological weapons attack by sealing their windows
with tape and plastic sheets let to panic buys and stockpiling of these items.80
In addition to personal risk profiling, individual responsibility for risk
management arises from a number of factors in private security industry risk
identification discourses. Foremost is the alleged failure of government agencies to
provide efficient, effective and accountable risk management. As Intacept Security
Ltd. writes, ‘we know Police resources are being stretched daily and their
attendance at a premises [sic] depends greatly on operational commitments.’81
Moreover, private security companies assert that individual responsibility to
protect against risks is an issue of corporate governance and duty of care,
increasingly acknowledged as ‘legal and moral obligations’.82 Lastly, there is the
private risk industry itself which, in the guise of insurance companies, requires
specific security measures or offers lower premiums in return for precautionary
action.83
The demand expansion underlying the individualising and responsibilising logic
of the private security industry also characterises the mechanisms used for risk
identification such as profiling and risk surveys. Typically employed at the first
stage of a risk management consultation and offered by some companies as a free
service, profiling and risk surveys promise to pinpoint the particular risks faced by
individual customers and encourage them to take precautionary measures.84 Both
mechanisms, thereby, increase the influence of industry experts on risk identifi-
cation. At the centre of their analyses stands the ‘expertise’ and ‘specialised
knowledge’ of risk professionals regarding ‘realistic’ unknown and unknown-
unknown risks rather than the customer’s personal experience of known dangers.85
In fact, the explicit aim of risk surveys is to inform clients about potential and
future risks they have been unaware of.86
77 Altheide and Michalowski, ‘Fear in the News’, p. 481. Unsolicited personal advice received from a
police officer in an area that had seen repeated theft in Bristol.
78 Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate, ‘Communicating the Terrorist Risk: Harnessing a Culture of
Fear?’, Crime, Media, Culture, 2:2 (2006), pp. 123–42, p. 134.
79 Financial Times, ‘London Businesses Told to Upgrade Security’ (14 July 2005).
80 Spence, ‘World Risk Society and War against Terror’, p. 294.
81 Intacept Security Ltd., at: {http://www.intaceptsecurity.com}.
82 Octaga Security Services Ltd., at: {http://www.octaga.co.uk}; Pilgrims Group Ltd., at: {http://www.
pilgrimsgroup.com}; G4S Security Services (UK) Ltd., at: {http://www.g4s.com/uk-security/}.
83 Sawley Security Ltd., at: {http://www.sawleysecurity.co.uk}; Unit Group Ltd., at: {http://www.
unitgroup.co.uk}; Intacept Security Ltd., at: {http://www.intaceptsecurity.com}.
84 See, for example, Polyguard Security Services Ltd., at: {http://www.polyguardsecurities.com;
Guardforce Security Services Ltd., at: {http://www.guardforce-security.com}.
85 Octaga Security Services Ltd., at: {http://www.octaga.co.uk}.
86 Pilgrims Group Ltd., at: {http://www.pilgrimsgroup.com}; G4S Security Services (UK) Ltd., at:
{http://www.g4s.com/uk-security/}.
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Private security firms also perpetuate the demand for commercial risk identi-
fication by emphasising the constantly shifting nature of risks: ‘continuous
evaluation enables us to anticipate and respond to the rapid changes to security
risks that characterise clients’ operating environments.’87 In addition, they highlight
the changing needs of the customer. As Group 4 Securior (G4S), the largest private
security company in the world asserts, ‘As your business changes, so does your
security risk profile.’88 Risk identification is never complete. Instead, the websites
of private security firms stress the need for a regular review of a client’s risks. ‘The
assessment of risk is not a one-off event; it is an ongoing process of evaluation and
review, and Pilgrims will work with you as your operations develop.’89 Many firms
recommend security ‘health checks’ on an annual basis.90 Ironically, research has
shown that risk analyses tend to increase fear rather than reduce it and lead to
increased demand for assurance through regular check-ups.91
Risk assessment
Risk identification frequently merges with the subsequent assessment of risks in
terms their relative probability and impact in order to establish priorities for
intervention. Nevertheless, this stage of commercial risk management has a number
of distinct logics and strategies. While governmental risk assessment has been
linked to ‘zero risk, worst case scenario, shifting burden of proof and serious and
irreversible damage’, the primary risk assessment logics of the private security
industry revolve around the concepts of vulnerability and risk minimisation.92
Security surveys and penetration testing serve to implement these logics, while a
discourse of risk management as an ‘investment’ justifies the additional expenses.
The logic of vulnerability deserves particular attention because it expands
private demand for security services by reinforcing the individualisation and
responsibilisation of commercial risk identification. The concept of vulnerability
does so by shifting the central focus of risk assessment from the danger to the
potential target. Conventionally risks are calculated and compared in terms of the
statistical frequency and magnitude of a particular danger for a given collective
and time period. The US State Department, for example, measures the national
and global risk of terrorism as the number of attacks and casualties per country
each year.93 These statistics show that the risk of becoming a casualty in a terrorist
attack is extremely low in most North American and European countries.
The focus on vulnerability changes this calculation. Instead of the statistical
analysis of the danger, it focuses on the characteristics of the potential target to
estimate the likelihood and probable impact of a danger. Specifically, it measures
87 Hart Security Ltd., at: {http://www.hartsecurity.com}.
88 G4S Security Services (UK) Ltd., at: {http://www.g4s.com/uk-security/}.
89 Pilgrims Group Ltd., at: {http://www.pilgrimsgroup.com}; Ian Johnson Associates Ltd., at: {http://
www.ija.co.uk}; G4S Security Services (UK) Ltd., at: {http://www.g4s.com/uk-security/}.
90 Ian Johnson Associates Ltd., at: {http://www.ija.co.uk}.
91 Altheide and Michalowski, ‘Fear in the News’, p. 496; Press et al., ‘Collective Fear, Individualized
Risk’, p. 238.
92 Aradau and van Munster, ‘Governing Terrorism through Risk’, p. 103.
93 US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003. Available at: {http://www.state.gov/s/
ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/c12153.htm}.
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the level of risk in terms of the exposure and weaknesses of the client defined by
his or her behaviour and ability to repel or survive an attack. In the case of
terrorism, the logic of vulnerability suggests that, although the collective risk of
terrorism is negligible, the industry can still present it as a high personal risk
because of the lifestyle and lack of protection of the individual.
In some cases, the logic of vulnerability even suggests that the probability and
magnitude of a risk increases because of the weaknesses of the potential target.
According to this argument, a client who is seen to be vulnerable encourages a
perpetrator to attack. Individuals who do not reduce their vulnerabilities are
responsible for their own harm. In the literature on crime and policing, this
transfer of responsibility for crime victimisation to the individual has characterised
the concept of situational crime prevention. The situational crime prevention
approach contends that individuals can reduce their vulnerability to crime by
increasing the cost and decreasing the rewards for the potential perpetrator.94
The political and industry discourses on crime prevention, therefore, emphasise the
responsibility of the victim for collective crime levels.95 As a result, some, like the
former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, ‘[blame] a large proportion of
crime on the victims’ carelessness.’96 Situational crime prevention implies that it is
not external factors such as poverty or the childhood experiences of the perpetrator
which lead to crime, but the failure of the individual victim to take precautionary
measures. In effect, the target is portrayed as causing crime by its vulnerability.
A second logic of commercial risk assessment is the concern with minimising
risk. This logic explicitly recognises that zero risk does not exist. Nevertheless, it
increases demand for private security equipment and services by directing the
evaluation of risk away from the questions of the probability and impact of known
dangers toward the aim of minimising even unknown and unknown-unknown
risks. Although the objective of risk assessment is to establish priorities for risk
mitigation and the risk industry does indeed make such recommendations, the logic
of risk minimisation encourages the elimination of any possible exposure or
weaknesses. Intacept Security Ltd., for example, offers to carry out an analysis of
‘any vulnerable points’.97
The preoccupation of commercial risk assessment with vulnerability and risk
minimisation features widely in the advertisements of private security companies in
the UK. One company website brings both together: ‘Our focus is on assessing
your premises; reviewing current security provision and identifying the weak areas
criminals are likely to target. By minimising pre-existing security risks we can
develop an appropriate method of dealing with criminal activity [. . .]’.98 These
advertisements also highlight the utility of commercial security surveys or audits
and penetration testing as means for the assessment of vulnerabilities. The Pilgrims
Group claims that through a ‘thorough survey or audit we will present a realistic
and holistic analysis of your current security strengths and weaknesses.’99
94 Pat O’Malley, Risk, Uncertainty and Government (London: The Glass House Press, 2004), p. 138.
95 O’Malley, ‘Criminology and Risk’, p. 49.
96 The Age (28 September 1990), cited in: O’Malley, Risk, Uncertainty and Government, p. 139.
97 Intacept Security Ltd., at: {http://www.intaceptsecurity.com}.
98 Allander Security Ltd., at: {http://www.allandersecurity.com}. See also G4S Security Services (UK)
Ltd., at: {http://www.g4s.com/uk-security/}. Emphasis added.
99 Pilgrims Group Ltd., at: {http://www.pilgrimsgroup.com}.
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Interestingly, the private security industry justifies its logics of vulnerability and
risk minimisation through a discourse of risk management as an ‘investment’
rather than an expense.100 It suggests that the more a customer spends on risk
management, the more he or she is likely to save. According to the websites of
numerous private security firms, such an investment can ‘pay for itself’ either
through lower insurance premiums, avoided losses and harm, or greater efficiency
because clients are freed from ‘the time-consuming and costly day-to-day responsi-
bility’ of their own risk management.101
Risk mitigation
The third stage of private risk management is risk mitigation, that is, efforts to
prevent or reduce damage caused by risks. In the practices of the private security
industry, it is shaped by three logics. The first is the management of consequences
rather than causes. The second logic is risk mitigation as assurance. The third is
risk mitigation as a continuous process. All three use the language of unknown and
unknown-unknown risks to perpetuate the demand for commercial risk mitigation
by asserting that risks can never be fully eliminated, because their causes are
beyond comprehension and intervention. Instead, these logics promote perpetual
risk mitigation which offers reassurance by claiming to minimise their clients’
alleged weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Moreover, they are implemented through
demand-expanding strategies which present and provide security as an individual-
ised, excludable service rather than a collective good.
The concern with consequences rather than causes is, according to Beck, one of
the key features of commercial risk management. Thus, Beck observes that the
private industry only
‘copes’ with the symptoms and symbols of risks. As they are dealt with in this way, the risks
must grow, they must not actually be eliminated as causes or sources. Everything must take
place in the context of a cosmetics of risk, packaging, reducing the symptoms of pollutants,
installing filters while retaining the source of the filth. Hence, we have not a preventive but
a symbolic industry and policy of eliminating the increase in risks.102
The concern with consequences highlights that risk mitigation is not always or
necessarily preventative.103 While many businesses claim to prevent risks, their
assertions are usually misleading. One example is the alleged prevention of breast
cancer through commercial genetic testing. As Press et al. point out, this promise
is disingenuous because, ‘science has not “cured” or “prevented” breast cancer.’104
What firms really offer is the detection of purportedly ‘risky’ genes and the
pre-emption of their potential consequences through mastectomies. Not only are
the claims of private businesses deceptive, they also shift the focus from addressing
100 G4S Security Services (UK) Ltd., at: {http://www.g4s.com/uk-security/}.
101 Intacept Security Ltd., at: {http://www.intaceptsecurity.com}; Danhouse Security Ltd., at: {http://
www.danhouse.co.uk}. See also Pilgrims Group Ltd., at: {http://www.pilgrimsgroup.com}; Unit Group
Ltd., at: {http://www.unitgroup.co.uk}; Vigil Security Management Ltd., at: {http://www.vigilsecurity.
co.uk}; Westguard Security Ltd., at: {http://www.westguardsecurity.co.uk}.
102 Beck, Risk Society, p. 57.
103 O’Malley, ‘Criminology and Risk’, p. 44.
104 Press et al., ‘Collective Fear, Individualized Risk’, p. 241.
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the collective causes that can trigger those genes to develop into breast cancer such
as the spread of pesticides and hormones in food and water to the individual
susceptibility to and management of these risks.
To clarify such misunderstandings, it is necessary to distinguish between
precaution and prevention. Due to the concern about the future inherent in the
concept of risk, all risk mitigation can be said to be precautionary by definition.
They all involve ‘measures taken in advance to avert a possible evil’.105 However,
precaution is not synonymous with prevention. According to both Beck and Press
et al., the term prevention implies an action that eliminates the causes of a risk
and, thus, the risk itself. In this sense, most commercial risk mitigation might be
precautionary, but it is rarely preventative because it attempts merely to minimise
the potential consequences of a danger for an individual client.
In the discourse of the private security industry, the preoccupation with
consequences rather than causes is justified by the complexity of contemporary
security risks, such as global warming and the development of chemical and
biological weapons. While the origins of threats are clearly identifiable, those of
unknown and unknown-unknown risks are either obscured by multiple and
complex causalities or the lack of data and experience. In the absence of any
definitive understanding of the root causes of contemporary risks, the industry can
only offer to mitigate their potential impact. Another factor, however, is the public
goods nature of preventative risk mitigation.106 Firms find it difficult to make
potential customers pay for such services because of a free-rider problem. The
problem is that the elimination of risks such as terrorism or global warming is
non-excludable, that is, it is not possible to exclude people from its benefits. Since
people can ‘free-ride’ on such services, they have no interest in paying for them and
firms will fail to cover even their own cost. The mitigation of consequences on the
other hand is excludable since it regards the reduction of the vulnerabilities of
potential targets. It can be made to benefit only paying customers and, thus, can
be sold for profit.
Since private risk management firms do not eliminate risks, the second logic
underlying commercial risk mitigation is assurance. The risks remain, but the
discourse and services of the industry assure clients that they have done all that is
possible to protect themselves. Thus, many measures against crime aim to reduce
fear rather than crime itself.107 This includes technologies such as panic buttons,
burglar alarms and CCTV cameras. The phrase ‘peace of mind’ is the single
most frequent statement on private security industry websites after references to
the ‘bespoke’, that is, individualised, nature of commercial risk management.108
Few of these risk mitigation mechanisms have a measurable effect on crime
105 Precaution at: {http://www.dictionary.com}.
106 Elke Krahmann, ‘Security: Collective Good or Commodity?’, European Journal of International
Relations, 14:3 (2008), pp. 379–404.
107 Furedi, Culture of Fear Revisited, p. 2.
108 Advance Security, at: {http://www.advancesecurity.co.uk}; Allander Security Ltd., at: {http://www.
allandersecurity.com}; Checkmate Guarding & Security, at: {http://www.checkmate-guarding.co.uk};
Contract Security Services, at: {http://www.contractsecurity.co.uk}; Crown Security Services, at:
{http://www.crownsecurity.uk.com}; Danhouse Security Ltd., at: {http://www.danhouse.co.uk}; Duval
Security Ltd., at: {http://www.duvalsecurity.co.uk}; Intacept Security Ltd., at: {http://www.
intaceptsecurity.com}; Knight Security Ltd., at: {http://www.knightsecurityservices.co.uk}; Omni
Security Services Ltd., at: {http://www.omnisecurity.co.uk}.
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rates.109 CCTV cameras, for example, have lost their utility as a deterrence
mechanism in many areas because the poor quality of the videos, the complexity
of the visual data which so far resists computerised analysis and the huge amount
of the material prevent their effective use in the prosecution of terrorists and
criminals.110 Nevertheless, the turnover of the British CCTV monitoring industry
increased nearly tenfold from £59 million in 1991 to £509 million in 2005.
Ironically, measures designed to reassure people can amplify their fear. Extensive
security arrangements such as pervasive monitoring and increased patrols can
create the image of a dangerous environment making people feel unsafe in the first
place.111 The demand for assurance, thus, becomes self-perpetuating.
The third logic of risk mitigation follows directly from the focus on conse-
quences and assurance: the logic of permanent precaution. Since risks always exist
and it is impossible to predict when they strike, clients require continuous
assurance and risk mitigation 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Redguard
Security, for example, writes, ‘With your peace of mind our focus [. . .] our
procedures provide you with a service that is continuous, monitored and recorded
to ensure true 24 hour security [. . .]’.112 In short, as another company promises,
‘We will be there, whenever and wherever you need us.’113
The logic of permanent precaution also derives from the argument that risk
mitigation strategies and equipment need regular updating. Man-made risks such
as terrorism and crime are presented as ‘moving targets’ which adapt to and
actively seek to overcome established risk mitigation products and services.
According to Hart Security ‘criminal activity is usually only one step behind’ the
latest technological advances,114 and Allander Security warns that ‘As tagging and
surveillance systems develop, so to do the methods used by criminals to outwit
supposedly foolproof systems.’115 This means that not only do security services
have to be supplied on a continuous basis, but also that technological equipment
such as burglar alarms and security barriers have to be replaced frequently with
new models.
The strategies employed by the private industry directly reflect the above.
Analytically, one can differentiate between at least six possible risk mitigation
strategies: prevention, pre-emption, avoidance, deterrence, protection and resil-
ience. Due to the specific logics of the risk market, however, private security firms
tend to prefer some over others. The most widely offered commercial risk
mitigation mechanisms are deterrence and protection. Both are excludable, focus
on consequences, provide assurance and require permanent services. Less frequent
are avoidance and resilience. They meet the first three criteria, but do not usually
lead to long-term dependencies on private risk mitigation. Finally, preventative and
pre-emptive strategies are virtually absent from commercial risk mitigation because
they match none of the logics described above.
109 Brandon C. Welsh and David P. Farrington (eds), Preventing Crime: What Works for Children,
Offenders, Victims and Places (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), p. 8.
110 Owen Bowcott, ‘CCTV Boom Has Failed to Slash Crime, Says Police’, The Guardian (6 May 2008).
111 Lucia Zedner ‘Too Much Security?’, International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 31:3 (2003),
pp. 155–84, p. 165.
112 Redguard Security Ltd., at: {http://www.reguardsecurity.co.uk}.
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Preventative risk management may be understood as goods and services which
target the underlying root causes of a risk. In the case of terrorism, this might
include addressing the grievances of terrorist groups and their perceived exclusion
from legitimate political processes. With regard to crime, it can involve the
reduction of poverty or drug dependency. As has been argued above, private firms
are unlikely to offer truly preventative services to private customers because the
benefits of eliminating a risk are non-excludable and, therefore, impossible to sell
for profit. The American Security Industry Association, for example, lists 26
market sectors, including burglar alarms, CCTV, computer security, mobile
security, personal security devices and outdoor protection, but none refers to
services which address the origins of dangers.116 In most cases, preventative
measures are left to governments which can fund them through general taxation.117
Pre-emptive strategies can be defined as those which destroy the danger before
it takes effect. This can be achieved either by eliminating the potential perpetrator
or source, such as a terrorist or WMD, or by erasing the potential target, as in the
case of pre-emptive mastectomies mentioned above. Since both measures assume a
danger (and guilt) before it materialises and can be very destructive, neither states
nor businesses like to turn to pre-emption. In fact, most societies prohibit private
individuals and businesses from taking pre-emptive measures against security
threats emanating from other human beings. Private security firms often emphasise
that their services are purely defensive, that is, that their personnel only shoot in
self-defence or in defence of their clients.118 Even less radical pre-emptive actions
such as the identification of ‘risky’ employees or prohibitions against the carrying
of weapons in shopping malls, are problematic because they infringe upon peoples’
rights and freedoms.
While pre-emption primarily targets potential perpetrators, avoidance strategies
encourage clients to modify their own behaviour in order to reduce their risks.
Avoidance strategies follow from the logic of risk minimisation and the manage-
ment of consequences. They can be an important mechanism where deterrence and
protection are likely to fail, such as regarding terrorists who are unlikely to
respond to threats of imprisonment or death. Nevertheless, only a small number of
private security firms promote avoidance as a suitable risk mitigation strategy and
offer related services such as risk consulting and training. ArmorGroup, is one of
the few firms to teach its clients ‘to recognise and avoid potential threats and equip
them, if necessary, to respond to terrorist actions, kidnappings and violent
crimes.’119 Admittedly, clients frequently hire private security firms because they
cannot avoid a risk.
The two primary commercial risk mitigation strategies are deterrence and
protection. Both show the greatest convergence with the logics of commercial risk
mitigation. Deterrence mechanisms seek to increase the cost or decrease the benefit
of carrying out an action that entails the risk of harm to their clients. Since
116 SIA, available from: {http://www.siaonline.org/_newmem.html}.
117 Sometimes governments choose to outsource these services to private firms. The British Security
Industry Association, thus, added in 2001 a new sector to its database entitled ‘police and public
security’. Arguably, however, governments are also influenced by the discourse and practices of the
private security industry when they become a customer.
118 Armor Group, at: {http://www.armorgroup.com/mediacentre/faqs/}; Blackwater, at: {http://www.npr.
org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14904069}.
119 ArmorGroup, at: {http://www.armorgroup.com/services/securitytraining/}.
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deterrence relies on the perception of the potential perpetrator, it is only suitable
for risks of human origin. In the case of terrorism and crime, private industry
deterrence typically operates in conjunction with the judiciary. Specifically, private
firms attempt to increase the likelihood that a perpetrator will be detected,
apprehended and successfully prosecuted. There are a whole range of services and
equipment aiming to deter potential attackers or criminals, including static guards,
mobile patrols, CCTV surveillance, security checks at buildings and airports,
intruder alarms, cash and property marking, access control technologies and IT
security solutions. The largest increases in turnover since 1991, however, have been
seen in two services: manned security guarding and remote CCTV monitoring (see
Figure 1). As 4 Forces Security advertises, mobile patrols are a ‘high visibility
security service that acts as a powerful deterrent’120 and Abal Security promises
that contract security guards can ‘deter high risk situations, where you may be
under threat of terrorist attack or armed robbery.’121 Notably, these two services
are the most demanding in terms of 24/7 provision, yet do the least to address the
root causes of security risks.
Some deterrence mechanisms such as security guards also have a protective
function, that is, they seek to minimise the potential harm done to clients or their
property. Protection usually works by reducing vulnerabilities or increasing
defensive capabilities of a customer. Since protection only applies to the specific
client who is safeguarded, it is the most excludable security mechanisms of all.
While deterrence strategies such as security patrols can have positive effects for
those in its vicinity, protection can be restricted to single individuals such as in the
use of bodyguards or body armour, to properties such as perimeter fencing and
patrols for gated communities, shopping malls or business estates, or to virtual
defences such as electronic ‘firewalls’ for computer systems. The popularity of
protective mechanisms with private businesses appears to lie in its close match with
the underlying logics of commercial risk management, including the individualisa-
tion of risk and the responsibilisation of potential targets, the concern with
vulnerabilities and risk minimisation, and the emphasis on assurance and the
perpetual mitigation of consequences. The extent to which the UK and the US
have become dependent upon commercial protection is staggering. The 2004
Report for Congress ‘Guarding America’ pointed out the increasing reliance of the
US on private protection, observing that 87 per cent of security guards employed
to safeguard infrastructure against terrorist attacks worked in the private sector.122
The last risk mitigation strategy regards the resilience of potential targets.
Resilience denotes the ability to carry on or recover after harm has been done.
Since resilience limits rather than expands demand, private security firms typically
promote resilience as an additional service in case deterrence or protection fails. To
enhance resilience, private security firms suggest a number of strategies. One
strategy relies on educating clients how to respond to attacks by setting up
‘incident management and crisis response’ procedures and executing ‘security
exercises and drills’.123 Another expands clients’ backup or redundant networking
120 4 Forces Security Ltd., at: {http://www.4forcessecurity.co.uk}.
121 Abal Security Ltd., at: {http://www.abalsecurity.com/}.
122 Parfomak (2004), Summary.
123 Hart Security UK Ltd., at: {http://www.hartsecurity.com/}. See also Ian Johnson Associates Ltd., at:
{http://www.ija.co.uk}.
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capacities in order to enable them to continue communicating and quickly access
alternative resources if their primary capabilities are compromised. As ECA
Resilience and Security Consultancy argues: ‘Only diversity ensures the resilience
essential to your communications’,124 while Red Cell Security emphasises improve-
ments to ‘supply and distribution chains.’125 Finally, firms offer to help their clients
to recover from an attack with ‘psychological trauma support’ and other
services.126
Together these strategies illustrate that commercial risk mitigation works
through a distinctive set of logics and mechanisms which serve to expand the
demand for private security services. It is thus not only the concept of risk and the
emergence of a culture of fear which has contributed to the rise and perpetuation
of the world risk society, but also the reflexive management of risk through a
growing industry. In the area of terrorism and crime, this industry has involved the
creation of a global private security sector which offers to minimise the risk to
private clients who increasingly doubt the capabilities of governments to protect
them against national and transnational dangers. However, at the same time as
they assure their clients, the logics and mechanisms of private security management
further undermine the belief in political responses as the discourses and practices
of private security firms suggest that contemporary security risks are individual and
diverse and can only be effectively contained by ‘bespoke’ commercial services.
Conclusion
The concept of the world risk society has gained increasing popularity in recent
years. However, the features and origins of the world risk society remain the
subject of controversial debate. While Beck envisages the rise of global political
movements which will challenge the nation-state and promote the emergence
of a cosmopolitan security community, his critics contend that the emergence of
‘new’ risks has led to the strengthening of the central authority and powers of
the state. This article has sought to present another perspective. Building on the
work of Beck and others, it has examined the role of private businesses in the
creation, management and perpetuation of the world risk society. Focussing on
the private management of security risk with regard to terrorism and crime in the
UK and the US, it has observed that the replacement of the concept of security
with risk has permitted private firms to identify a growing range of unknown and
unknown-unknown dangers which cannot be eliminated, but require continuous
risk management. Using the discourse of risk and its strategies of commercialised,
individualised and reactive risk management, private security companies have thus
contributed to the rise of a culture of fear in which the demand for security can
never be satisfied and guarantees continuous profits. The analysis concludes by
suggesting that the individualisation and responsibilisation of citizens combined
with the impression that risks can be ‘managed’ challenge Beck’s contention
that the world risk society will become increasingly politicised and develop
124 ECA Ltd., at: {http://www.ecalimited.co.uk}.
125 Red Cell Security, Ltd., at: {http://redcellsecurity.co.uk}.
126 Ibid.
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cosmopolitan solutions to contemporary hazards. At least within the UK and the
US, Beck’s utopian vision appears to be hampered by private industry solutions
which offer personal rather than collective risk management. Framed within
neo-liberal discourses of the small state and the superiority of the market, the
private management of risk promises to provide security not only more effectively,
but also more cost-efficiently than political and cosmopolitan bargaining.
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